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GIFTS OF GRAIN AND OTHER
FARM COMMODITIES
— by Neil E. Harl*
The sale of assets held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business (such
as grain or market livestock) usually produces ordinary
income.1  That rule has encouraged gifts of grain and other
farm commodities to spouses, children, grandchildren or
other family members who are not considered to be
holding the gift property for sale to customers.  The
outcome is capital asset treatment for gains and avoidance
of liability for self-employment tax.2
Adjustment to inventory
For a gift of grain, livestock or other items of
inventory, it has generally been assumed that gifts made
after the year of production would not require that
production expenses associated with the gift be reduced in
terms of deductibility.3  As stated in Rev. Rul. 55-138,4
which focused on an accrual basis taxpayer —
"There must be an adjustment to inventory effecting
the removal of the donated asset and the costs
pertaining thereto from the opening inventory in the
year of the gift.  Items of cost of the current year
applicable to such property are not deductible by the
donor, and similar items which have been deducted in
prior years must be removed from the amount of the
contribution in order to avoid a double deduction."
(Emphasis added.)
A similar position was taken in Rev. Rul. 55-5315 which
held that items of cost of donated assets were not
deductible in the year of gift or any subsequent year.  The
ruling noted that, for accrual basis taxpayers, there must
be an adjustment to opening inventory in the year of the
gift or any subsequent year.  The ruling noted that, for
accrual basis taxpayers, there must be an adjustment to
opening inventory in the year of the gift effecting the
removal of the cost or basis of the donated asset.  But
costs of production deducted prior to the year of the gift
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be reported back into income. Therefore, a strong
motivation has existed to delay the gift of grain held for
sale until the year following the year of production.
For gifts of grain after the year of production, the costs
of production (seed, fertilizer, chemicals, depreciation on
equipment and other deductible items) need not be
reported into income, the gift ordinarily has a zero income
tax basis and the full amount of the sales price is
considered a capital gain to the recipient.
Gifts to spouse
Recent private letter rulings6 have challenged gifts of
grain to a spouse where the obvious intent was to reduce
self-employment tax for the spouse involved in
production.  In a 1991 ruling, the Internal Revenue Service
held that transfers of soybeans from husband to wife as "a
reward for the companionship and patience with the
stressful lifestyle of farming" were ineffective to avoid
self-employment tax for the husband.7  The gift was
ineffective to avoid self-employment tax on the grounds
that — (1) there was no intent to make a gift, (2) it was
questionable whether the husband completely divested
himself of title, dominion and control over the soybeans,
(3) it was not clear whether the gift was of soybeans or of
a warehouse receipt and (4) the transaction lacked
economic substance or independent significance apart
from tax avoidance.8
It is clear that gifts of grain and other farm
commodities to a spouse (or other family members) will
be scrutinized carefully.  To be effective, the donor should
manifest a clear intent to make a gift, the donee should
assert dominion and control over the commodity and the
gift should be of the actual commodity, not of warehouse
receipts.  The case for an effective gift is strengthened if
the commodity is sold by the donee with the sale
occurring at a time other than when the donor may be
selling quantities of the same or similar commodities.
Moreover, after the gift to the donee, the donee should
bear the risk of loss for the commodity, be responsible for
storage charges and carry insurance on the commodity.
Indeed, the donor should have no contact with the
commodity and should not be responsible for its sale or in
any way be connected with its sale.
Even with those steps taken, gifts to spouses or other
close family members may be challenged if the principal
purpose appears to be avoidance of self-employment tax.
A reason for the gift other than minimizing self-
employment tax is helpful.
FOOTNOTES
1 See I.R.C. § 1221(1). See generally 4 Harl,
Agricultural Law § 27.02 (1993).
2 See I.R.C. § 1402.
3 See Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 C.B. 223; Rev. Rul. 55-
531, 1955-2 C.B. 520.
4 1955-1 C.B. 223.
5 1955-2 C.B. 520.
6 Ltr. Rul. 9210004, Nov. 29, 1991; Ltr. Rul. 9229002,
Feb. 28,1992.
7 Ltr. Rul. 9210004, Nov. 29, 1991.
8 Ltr. Rul. 9210004, Nov. 29, 1991.  See Ltr. Rul.
9229002, Feb.28, 1992 (same).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
COLOR OF TITLE. The parties’ lands were
separated by a river. The defendant’s predecessor in title
constructed a fence on the defendant’s property in the
1930’s which ran over a hill some distance from the river.
The disputed land was the strip between the fence and the
river on the defendant’s side of the river. The defendant’s
deed named the river as the defendant’s boundary but the
plaintiff’s deed listed the “hill on the other side” of the
river as its boundary. The plaintiffs used the disputed land
to graze cattle. The plaintiffs produced evidence that the
community considered the plaintiff’s land to run to the
fence on the other side of the river. Although the various
deeds were not consistent, the court upheld the jury
verdict that the plaintiff acquired the land by adverse
possession. The court held that the deed description of the
land boundary as the “hill on the other side” was sufficient
color of title to support adverse possession and that the
plaintiff’s grazing of cattle was sufficient hostile
possession to support adverse possession. Quarles v.
Arcega, 841 P.2d 550 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
HOSTILE POSSESSION . The defendant’s
predecessors in interest purchased 90 acres of land and
leased 14,000 contiguous acres from the plaintiff’s
predecessor in interest. The parties intended that the 90
acres included a parcel known as Solo Springs, but that
parcel was actually included in the legal description of the
leased portion. The defendant purchased Solo Springs
from the purchaser, based on the purchaser’s belief that
the parcel was owned by the purchaser. The defendant
built a house and other improvements on the parcel. The
defendant discovered the error in 1973 and 1978 after
having a survey performed. In 1979, the plaintiff
purchased 10,000 acres from the owner of the leased acres
and Solo Springs was included in the legal description of
the purchased acres. After the defendant requested a
quitclaim deed from the plaintiff based on adverse
possession of Solo Springs, the plaintiff brought the
present forcible entry and detainer action.  The court
upheld the trial court’s judgment for the defendant. The
court held that the prohibition of adverse possession by a
tenant against a landlord did not apply because neither the
defendant nor the predecessor in interest believed that they
leased the property from the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s
predecessor in interest. The court also held that the
improvements made by the defendant were sufficient
evidence and notice of hostile possession of the disputed
land. The court rejected the plaintiff’s defense that neither
it nor its predecessor in interest knew about the
defendant’s improvements. Lewis v. Pleasant Country,
Ltd., 840 P.2d 1051 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
OPEN POSSESSION. The plaintiff claimed title to
the disputed land by adverse possession under color of
deed. The plaintiff provided evidence of rotational rice
farming whereby the land was cropped one year and left
fallow for two or three years. For several years, no rice
was planted but the land was used for grazing, although no
fence was erected. The court held that the plaintiff’s
possession was not sufficiently visible to support title by
adverse possession because the land became sufficiently
overgrown so as to erase evidence of rice cropping.  In
addition, the use of the land for grazing was not sufficient
because the grazing was not continuous and no fence was
erected as evidence of hostile use. Parker v. McGinnes,
842 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  A third party had
obtained the debtor’s house by a tax sale in 1989. The
debtor’s redemption rights expired in June 1992 and the
third party obtained a tax deed on the property. The debtor
filed for bankruptcy in August 1992 and sought to avoid
the tax deed as a fraudulent conveyance under Section
548(a). The third party sought to dismiss the action
because the transfer occurred more than one year before
the bankruptcy petition. The court denied the third party’s
motion and held that the transfer occurred when the
